Abstract: Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who fight over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians differ from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the effect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two effects that go in opposite directions. While a direct effect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect effect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant effect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombia's civil war.
Introduction
Over 3100 civilians died in 92 massacres in Algeria between August 1996 and December 1998. 1 The war between the government and various Islamist insurgencies (notably the Armed Islamic Group) spanned between 1991 and 2002 and left a remarkably high civilian death toll. The legacy of massacres in Colombia is equally distressing: Between 1988 and 2005 Colombian guerrillas killed 1200 civilians in about 200 massacres while over 6100 died in just under 1000 massacres perpetrated by right-wing militias.
2 This pattern of terror is by no means inherent to these two countries. Targeting civilians was the main strategy of the Peruvian militias (Rondas Campesinas) to recover the rural strongholds under the control of the Shining Path. Before the cease …re declared in October 2002, the Sudan People's Liberation Army targeted civilians all across southern Sudan to punish alleged supporters of Karthoum-backed militias (Johnson, 1995) . During Museveni's rule in the 1990s, the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) alienated the local population in northern Uganda by massacring civilians. Later, to recover the lost territories, Museveni's National Revolutionary Army used the same strategy, killing alleged LRA supporters (Berkeley, 2001) .
Most civilian killings are deliberately planned by both state and non-state actors (Eck and Hultman, 2007) . The number civilians killed intentionally and directly in internal armed con ‡icts is about half the number of total deaths in combat.
3 War-induced famine and disease are likely to hit civilians further both during the con ‡ict and in the post-con ‡ict. The death of non-combatants represents an enormous long-term cost of civil war as it erodes the labor force of a country. In addition the deliberate killing of civilians nurses hatreds and revenge desires, triggering cycles of violence in what the World Bank calls a "con ‡ict trap" (World Bank, 2003) .
Civilians are targeted to create fear, spawn collaboration and consolidate control of contested territories. Neither the insurgency nor the incumbent can be successful without the support of civilians. The allegiance of the population is a primary objective of the armed groups in civil war. Contesting parties seek to form a "support network" of locals to secure the provision of food, shelter, supplies, information and recruits. The e¤ectiveness of such network determines the group's success in securing contested areas.
Hence the strategic rationale of targeting the civilian network of the enemy to weaken its power by damaging its local base. Petersen and Liaras (2006) argue that fear and terror are e¤ective weapons often used to bend the enemy's objectives. Azam and Hoe-er (2002) show that in Subsaharan Africa terrorizing civilians is often used to substitute for actual combat. Because they generate widespread fear, civilian killings not only reduce the support of the enemy but also increase compliance with the perpetrator. So the degree of which di¤erent armed groups receive support from the population is endogenous to the dynamics of con ‡ict (Kalyvas, 2006) : On the one hand, armed groups constantly attempt to secure popular collaboration and deter support to rival groups. On the other, irrespective of their true preferences, most people tend to collaborate with the group that maximizes their survival opportunities. Indeed, when caught in a juncture of violence people naturally tend to put survival considerations and the protection of their family and property before their political preferences. Thus, the control of a speci…c territory by one group often leads to compliance from local communities. 5 Civilians are then compelled to participate in combat for strategic considerations rather than ideology. Greater compliance from the civilian population in turn helps consolidating control, making collaboration and control mutually reinforcing.
Collaboration is a zero-sum game. It must be exclusive and such condition is enforced with violence. Defection is severely punished. Information leaks, for example, are often punished with execution. Killing defectors creates widespread fear, which deters others from doing so. In addition, non-compliance with one group is equated with treason and also punished: Neutrality is not an option for the civilian population who often, and not without risk, prefer to ‡ee the contested region. Households who choose to stay must show some allegiance to one group or the other. Civil war is a polarizing process.
There are many factors that can alter the balance of power between the armed groups of a civil war. A foreign power may intervene by providing …nan-cial aid or military support to one group. During the Cold War a number of civil strifes an Africa and Latin America were e¤ectively proxy wars featuring the support of either the US or the USSR to incumbent regimes or insurgent movements. Several African governments supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe have allegedly …nanced armed movements in Congo at least since the fall of Mobutu in 1996. More recently, the Colombian con ‡ict has increasingly been shaped by the participation of international actors and both the government and the rebels have bene…ted from external support: While the Colombian government is the largest recipient of military aid from the US in the western who brought to their camps food, medicine, messages, liquor, prostitutes, and these types of things. And we realized that we could isolate them and that this strategy would give us very good results" (Quoted in Kirk, 2003) . 5 According to Cenarro (2002) , during the Spanish Civil War many leftists living in regions dominated by the right-wing militias ended up supporting them.
In Colombia, collaboration with the FARC and ELN guerrillas is almost completely a rural phenomenon.
hemisphere, the Chavez regime from neighbor Venezuela has been accused of protecting and …nancing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Intervention from abroad can also take the form of donations from diasporas. Examples abound and range from the support of the Tamil diaspora in North America to Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers -to the support Albanian diaspora in Europe to the Kosovo Liberation Army. The balance of power in civil war can also be altered by ‡uctuations in the value of natural resources that are used to …nance armed groups.
6 Additionally, Ross (2005) reports that rebel groups have been able to raise substantial …nance by selling the future rights to war booty. Insurgencies in Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone have used this practice. Finally, armed groups can boost their power by merging into uni…ed armies thereby sharing intelligence and taking advantage of military economies of scale. One example is the collusion in 1997 of several local right-wing militias in Colombia.
How is the security of the civilian population a¤ected by shifts in the relative balance of power of armed groups? Because civilians are strategically targeted by local rebels and militias, the consequences of the empowerment of one of them may be catastrophic. A stronger military capacity boosts the ability of generating widespread fear by killing the civilian infrastructure of the enemy. This direct e¤ect of military empowerment maps into higher tolls of civilian casualties. However, an empowered army that has built a reputation of executing enemy supporters is more frightful, and so induces some civilians to shift their support towards it. Thus there is an indirect e¤ect of empowerment that works in the opposite direction and saves lives. The ultimate e¤ect on civilians casualties depends on the relative size of the direct e¤ect vis-a-vis de indirect e¤ect. This paper develops a simple rational choice model in which two armed groups …ght for the control of a strategic territory. Local civilians are compelled to decide which groups to support. This decision depends on the combination of material payo¤s and coercion o¤ered by each group to the civilians as well as on an idiosyncratic political preference that every individual has towards one armed group. One obvious result of this simpli…ed framework is that when the majority of the population has strong a priori preferences towards one group, compliance is so massive that such group is likely to consolidate territorial control easily.
7
I derive an expression for the equilibrium number of civilians killed by either armed group. The size of civilian casualties depends on the equilibrium size of the "support networks" of the armed groups and the military capacity of each of them. A testable comparative static is the e¤ect on the number of 6 Mahmud and Vargas (2008) provide an analytical framework to study the e¤ect of resource booms in civil war. They distinguish booms in cash crops like co¤ee from booms in resource intensive commodities like oil. The e¤ect of resource booms also depends on the regime type which proxies for whether the bene…ts of the boom are concentrated in the hands of the mass of citizens or the elite.
7 This 'corner solution' can be illustrated by the fact that most foreign powers …nd it extremely di¢ cult to subjugate colonized territories for too long. Polk (2007) argues that because most human beings are territorial, they are seldom willing to accept foreign rulers. 4 killings of a change in the balance of power of the two armies. I rationalize the conditions under which the direct e¤ect of empowerment dominates the indirect e¤ect and thus the casualty toll increases. Because the model describes a subnational phenomenon that cannot be contrasted with cross-national variation, I am able to test the predictions using micro-level con ‡ict data across circa 1000 Colombian municipalities for the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Consistent with the model, I show that everything else equal a shift in the military capacity of one group leads to an increase in the number of civilian killings only in territories in which the enemy is more powerful.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework and the main testable predictions. Section 3 discuses the case study of Colombia, a country that has experienced civil war for over 40 years and where about a third of all the casualties are civilians killed directly and intentionally. I exploit longitudinal variation across Colombian municipalities to test the model. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
I develop a simple analytical framework to study the pattern of civilian killings in civil war given the strategic role of non-combatants regarding the formation of networks for the provision of supplies, shelter and information to armed groups. Like Wintrobe (1998)'s model on how dictators survive in power, in this model armed actors simultaneously make use of carrots and sticks to achieve the compliance necessary to build support networks. On the one hand repression creates compliance by making people fear violent reprisals. On the other, loyalty can be secured through material bene…ts. The ideological preferences of the potential supporters also play a role. The allegiance of the population is a primary objective for the warring parties. No insurgency can be successful without the support of civilians and no incumbent can retain power without it. Russell (1974) 
Set up
Consider a territory of some strategic value in the context of an ongoing civil war. Controlling such territory is desirable by the armed groups in dispute, which I henceforth assume are only two: The rebels, R and the militia, M .
;9
There is a continuum of mass 1 of civilians each of whom must decide what group to support. Civilian i's payo¤ from supporting the rebels is linear and additive in her expected material reward and in an idiosyncratic component representing the individual's bias towards supporting the rebels. It can be represented with the utility function:
where M is the probability of being killed by the militia -who target i because of her support to the rebels-, w R is the material reward that i receives in exchange of her support, and i R is a non-negative payo¤ derived privately by civilian i and measured in the same units as w R : As in a standard probabilisticvoting model (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987 and Persson and Tabellini, 2000) this component of the utility can be interpreted as parametrizing the ideological bias of individual i towards group R.
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Similarly, individual i's utility from supporting the militia is:
where R is the probability of being killed by the rebels -who target i because of her support to the militia-, w M is the material payo¤ derived by such allegiance and i M is the non-negative idiosyncratic reward derived from supporting the militia.
For completeness, consider a third option whereby i does not support either armed group. In such case the utility of not taking part of the con ‡ict is given by:
where y is the outside option. This formulation captures the idea that neutrality is a very risky strategy in civil war. Collaborators to one armed group are automatically seen as non-collaborators of the rival group and hence targeted by 8 The choice of these two actors over the more obvious Rebels vs. Government game is consistent with the fact that in most civil wars it is illegal militias (usually with the acquiescence and support of the government) who target the civilian population. However this is just a choice of notation. The two armed groups described in this model could as well be two rebel groups. This has indeed been the case in speci…c areas of countries like Congo, Angola and Colombia. 9 The model abstracts from the reason why achieving control over the territory is important. Some such reasons may include the existence of a valuable natural resource, the control of which would help …nancing the armed struggle; the necessity of consolidating a safe haven for the cultivation of hard drugs or for the illegal transportation of arms and supplies; or the strategic proximity of an important city or enemy's camp.
1 0 For an application of this approach to the context of the trade-o¤ between democracy and …ghting, see Chacón, Robinson and Torvik (2007) . This parametrization of individual allegiance is also consitent with Petersen (2001)'s account of how ordinary people became involved in resistance movements in Eastern Europe. According to Petersen, there is wide variation in patterns of civilian support toward armed groups. The level of support varies from neutrality to sympathetic fellings to the provision of information to full involvement with the group. the latter (Kalyvas, 2006) . In this sense, the choice of neutrality implies becoming a target of both armed groups. For simplicity I assume that the neutrality alternative is strictly dominated by supporting either armed group for every civilian i: This is equivalent of assuming that i R;M cannot take extraordinarily high values and is naturally limited by survival considerations.
Opposition to all armed actors is of course observed in reality. Amidst other reasons, in order to avoid the risk inherent to not aligning with any armed group, a great number of civilians usually ‡ee from territories under dispute. According the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2006) , the country with the largest number of internally displaced people is Colombia. Iraq and Sudan rank second and third respectively. A Colombian NGO estimates that between 1988 and 2004 over 3 million people have internally migrated. The model I present here abstracts from this phenomenon and in some sense deals with the situation of civilians who choose not to ‡ee, and stay after any mass displacement has taken place. The fact that in the model those who stay are forced to take side in the con ‡ict is consistent with the empirical observation that collaboration must be exclusive.
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The relative importance of w j ; j and i j ; j = fR; M g depends of the stage of the civil war at which …ghting takes place. The average civil war lasts about 16 years (Fearon, 2004) . When the …ghting has lasted long enough, the provision of material incentives gets harder as a larger share of the country's infrastructure has been damaged and local economies have been disrupted. As a result, the relative importance of w j may be o¤set overtime by an increase in coercion j . The parameter i j is also likely to lose importance in the long run: initial ideological convictions may be replaced by the accumulated hatreds created by a long-lasting con ‡ict.
Given equations (1) and (2) civilian i will support the rebels if:
where:
This parameter is crucial in the analysis since it gives the private component to (3) and hence allows individuals to di¤er in their optimal decision. Notice that, in the absence of i , for any given set of material compensations and coercion parameters, every civilian would support the same armed group. To focus on the more interesting case in which civilian support is divided between the two groups, let be distributed across civilians according to the probability density function f ( ).
From inequality (3) it follows that any civilian i for which i < b will support the rebels. Otherwise, she will support the militia. Hence, the fraction of civilians who align with the rebels (N R ) in equilibrium is:
while a fraction N M = 1 N R aligns with the militia.
Note that f ( ) depends on how attached the local population is to the cause of one group or the other. In an extreme case, for a particular civilian i, i would be su¢ ciently negative (positive) that i would strongly support the rebels (the militia). In order to make i switch sides the enemy would have to o¤er extremely high material rewards (w) but also high threats ( ).
Polk (2007) argues that the very presence of foreigners who attempt to control a speci…c region stimulates a strong sense of group cohesion among natives that often materializes in strong insurgency movements. To Polk the Vietnam experience is the ultimate example of how, regardless of how many soldiers and civilians are killed, how much money is spent and how powerful and sophisticated are the weapons, foreigners cannot militarily defeat an insurgency that is supported by the majority of the people, except perhaps by genocide. Examples range from the Spanish Guerrilla against the French in the early 19th century to the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the 1950s to, arguably, today's armed resistance in Iraq against the Americans.
In sharp contrast with the corner solution in which a foreign power is ultimately defeated by a cohesive resistance, in most instances i is likely to be su¢ ciently small for the majority of the population. Only a small share of civilians will be tightly attached to one party or the other. In fact, the majority of people tend to be only weakly committed to any speci…c group. That is, the average non-combatant does not support any cause with su¢ cient conviction so as to be willing to make big sacri…ces. In this case of "weak" inherent preferences, material incentives and military considerations can be more important than actual political preferences at driving actions (what group to show allegiance to). In fact, irrespective of preferences, equilibrium behavior in terms of support to a given group can change. Switching sides is common in civil war: entire Algerian communities in the early 1990s defected the GIA to join the militias (Kalyvas, 1999) . Widespread fear created by the Rondas Campesinas led to massive desertions of insurgents from the Shining Path in Peru during the 1980s. The Zapatista Revolution in early 20th century Mexico was only able to overthrow Por…rio Diaz when twenty six thousand men deserted from the constitutional army and joined the rebels (Wolf, 1973) . In Colombia, 46% of the 316 FARC members demobilized by 2002 stated that they joined the guerrilla by force because a salary was promised, or simply because of fear. Only 12% of the subjects claim to have joined the insurgency for ideological reasons (Pinto et al., 2002) . 
Civilian casualties
In this reduced-form framework, where the risk of death is unavoidable and given both coercion j and material incentives w j civilians who decide to support one group are targeted by the other, both the rebels and the militia end up killing civilians. This is consistent with the observation that in civil wars featuring local contests for territorial control, civilian communities are strategically targeted by all armed actors. In the model, the total number of civilian killings, K T ; is then the sum of killings by the rebels and by the militia. This can be written:
where the …rst term of the right hand side is the share of militia supporters killed by the rebels, K R , according to their power R ; and the second is the share of rebel supporters killed by the militia, K M . I assume that R and M depend respectively on the power the militia and the rebels. Hence j provides the key comparative static of the model. Empowerment of group j maps into an increase in the parameter j . Note that the assumption is that a more powerful group is more deadly.
Empowerment
There are many di¤erent potential reasons why the balance of power between two armed groups can change in civil war. Foreign intervention is perhaps the most notorious. The involvement of the Soviet Union and the US in Africa and Latin America during the Cold War is an illustrative example. While the USSR gave military and …nancial support to "communist" insurgencies …ghting in most cases against authoritarian regimes, the US backed incumbents in their struggle to content such insurgencies. Congo's president Joseph Mobutu is a telling example of a ruthless dictator backed by successive American administrations because of its strategic value in the anti-communist campaign in Central Africa. Donations by diasporas living in rich countries are another potential source of empowerment. For many years the main source of …nance of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front was its huge diaspora (World Bank, 2003) . Irish Americans were suspected of contributing to the campaign of IRA in Great Britain. Secondly, insurgent organizations in Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone have acquired non-negligible resources by selling the future rights on the war booty (Ross, 2005) . Third, ‡uctuations in the value of natural resources used to …nance armed struggles, like oil or diamonds are also a potential source for the relative empowerment of one groups. Finally, there are also cases of alliances and mergers of armed groups after which the resulting force is able to bene…t from increasing returns in the use of mass violence. The spectacular upsurge of the late 1990s in militia activity in Colombia documented by Restrepo
Arguably the most ideological of the combatants of a rebel group are underrepresented among those who demobilize. et al. (2004) originated in the collusion of a large number of militias from di¤erent parts of the country under an umbrella organization.
In the context of their strategic role in civil war as the source of the support networks necessary for victory, would more civilians get killed if one group becomes stronger? I use the simple framework developed above and summarized in (5) to study how changes in the military capacity of one group change the magnitude and structure of civilian victimization. That this empowerment and hence greater lethality translates into a greater number of killings is not obvious and I explore the conditions under which this is the most likely outcome. Assuming that more power maps into more killing capacity there is a clear direct e¤ect whereby the number of deaths will increase. However, everything else equal, a more lethal group attracts more supporters who shift sides to reduce the chance of being killed. This indirect e¤ect can o¤set the aforementioned direct e¤ect and the net impact on the number of casualties is ambiguous.
I illustrate these opposite e¤ects by means of equation (5). I examine an increase of, say M ; on K T : The total change in civilian casualties due to an increase in the lethality of the militia, @K T =@ M can be decomposed in the change in rebel victims, @K R =@ M ; and the change in civilians killed by the militia, @K M =@ M : The …rst component can be written:
This expression is positive because R is positive and -using the chain rule-
can be written as the product of two negative numbers, so it's also positive. To see this notice that
Lemma 1
An increase in the power of the militia leads to an increase in the number of civilians killed by the rebels This result at …rst appears counterintuitive. The logic behind it is that, everything else equal, a more powerful militia will attract more supporters (the indirect e¤ect) and hence the target population of the rebels will increase.
As conjectured, the e¤ect of higher military capacity of the militia on the number of civilians killed by the militia @K M =@ M ; is not unambiguous. Notice from equation (5) that:
where the …rst term of the right hand side, the civilian support of the rebels, is greater than zero and the second is less than zero. The latter claim follows from the fact that
and, while @N R =@b > 0; as pointed out above @b @ M < 0. The e¤ect of a shift in the military capacity of the militia on the number of civilians killed by the militia depends on whether or not the direct e¤ect of an increase in M dominates the indirect e¤ect.
Lemma 2
The change in the number of civilians killed by the militias due to an increase in their own power is:
; so the direct e¤ ect dominates and
; so the indirect e¤ ect dominates and
; so the two e¤ ects cancel out and K M remains unchanged Since both N R and N M depend on b which in turn depends on ( j ; w j ); the dominant e¤ect will be determined by the parameters of the model. In order to generate testable comparative statics, I now give a speci…c functional form to f ( ); the distribution across the civilian population of the net component of political preferences on civilians' payo¤. I assume i is uniformly distributed across civilians in the interval
1 2 i : Recall that for any civilian i who is ideologically biased towards the rebels: i > 0; while i < 0 re ‡ects bias toward the militia. With this particular probability density function the density is inversely related to the strength of ideology in the population. That is, is directly proportional to how responsive individuals are to material incentives or coercion. Given the functional form equation (4) becomes:
Recall that the condition for an increase in the number of civilians killed by the militia due to an increase in their power is N R > M (@N R =@ M ) : Using equation (6) this can be written as M < M with the critical value M de…ned as:
Summarizing the results so far, an increase in M will lead to an unambiguous increase in K R because the support of the militia increases and so does the pool of civilians targeted by the rebels. In addition, to the extent that M < M the direct e¤ect of being more deadly will dominate and the number of civilians killed by the militia will also increase. Hence, the total number of civilian casualties will increase as long as M < M : However, if M > M the indirect e¤ect dominates and the reduction in N R due to the greater power of the militia will o¤set the increase in militia lethality so that the empowered militia will end up killing less civilians. Under this scenario and giving that @K R =@ M is unambiguously positive, it is uncertain what happens with the total number of killings.
If the increase in civilian casualties by the rebels is proportionally greater than the decrease in militia killings, overall more civilians will get killed when the balance of power shifts in favor of the militia. That is @K R =@ M +@K M =@ M > 0: Using equation (6) this can be written as M < M with the new critical threshold M de…ned as:
Proposition 1 summarizes the impact a shift in the balance of power that favors the militia (and hence the impact of and increase in M ) on the number and structure of civilian casualties in this model.
Proposition 1
Let M and M be de…ned as above. From Lemma 1 it follows that
; so that 
; which is greater than zero.
For strictly positive killing probabilities of the militia, as long as 0
But it is decreasing once M is greater than the threshold M : In turn, K T is increasing in M up to M > M ; and decreasing thereafter. When M = 1; civilians will die with certainty if they support the guerrilla. Survival considerations imply a natural bound to positive values of i so that 
Comparative statics
Recall that @K M =@ M is positive if and only if M < M : Further, note from equation (7) that M is increasing in R : Since M = M + R 2 ; then M is also increasing in R : It follows that a higher military capability of the rebel group is associated with a larger parameter space for which an empowerment of the militia will result in a higher death toll of civilians. This is a priori not an obvious result. Intuitively this is because a higher R implies that civilians who support the militia are more likely to be killed and hence the indirect e¤ect of an increase in M -whereby the support to the empowered militia increaseswill be weakened by the fact that the rebels themselves are also more lethal so militia collaborators will be targeted by a more powerful enemy. Thus, the fact that the indirect e¤ect gets weakened is due to the fear that the rebels generate among the civilians. In the next section I test this prediction using longitudinal data of con ‡ict-related violence in Colombia.
Albeit not directly testable with the data at hand, equation (7) o¤ers other comparative statics of interest. For instance, M is decreasing in : That is, when civilians are less ideological and hence more responsive to coercion and material incentives, the increase in the lethality of the militia generates a higher incentive to comply with them. Hence it is more likely that the indirect e¤ ect will o¤set the direct one so less civilians will be killed.
In addition M is decreasing in w M which emphasizes the fact that on top of coercion, illegal groups can o¤er material incentives to increase compliance of their support network, thereby reducing the support of the enemy and thus the number of targeted people. Colombia's civil war involves rebel insurgencies, government forces and illegal militias. By most accounts the civil war has lasted over four decades and scholars identify its origin in La Violencia, a period of intense violence between the two traditional political parties from 1946 to 1966. Insurgent groups were formed in the early 1960s as peasant self-defense organizations originally aligned with the Liberal party. Two of them survive today as the main guerrilla organizations: the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) with about 20,000 and 4,000 combatants respectively. While allegedly the main objective of these groups is taking over political power, their actions have increasingly relied on terrorism. For instance the two most important sources of …nance for rebel groups from the early 1990s are the drug business and the kidnapping of civilians. Drugs are a major source of …nance especially for the FARC, which is known to tax coca crops, and to control the production, processing and export of cocaine and heroine. In terms of bellicose activity the most common guerrilla actions are the disruption of the economic infrastructure (e.g, attacks to oil pipelines), attacks to government military positions, and bombings and road blocks. The other major active armed actors of the con ‡ict are the illegal militias, called paramilitary forces. They are said to have had over 12,000 members at the peak of their strength. The …rst militias were organized by the military during the late 1970s thanks to a law that permitted the formation of armed self-defense organizations of civilians encouraged to …ght against the insurgents. Subsequently, rural elites formed private armies which emerged on a widespread scale during the eighties when drug lords started becoming landowners and facing extortion from the guerillas. These militias were banned in 1989 but kept operating in the shadow after which the Colombian con ‡ict technically became three-sided. However, in recent years the vast majority of the …ghting involves the guerilla against the military. Paramilitaries are not primarily a clash force and try to avoid direct combat with either the guerrilla or the government forces. Rather, the militia specializes in selective killings of civilians whom they presume support the rebels. Seven out of ten civilians killed in Colombia from 1988 to 2005 have been victimized by armed militias, often with the alleged acquiescence of the military. Over 70% of all the uncontested attacks carried out by militias have been massacres, with incursions, check points and kidnapping taking up the slack (Restrepo and Spagat, 2004).
The United Self-Defense of Colombia-AUC
In 1997, several disparate local militias came together under an umbrella alliance called the United Self-Defense of Colombia (AUC), which contributed substantially to the dramatic expansion of con ‡ict-activity during the late 1990s. The AUC intensi…ed its strategy of targeting civilians. Two thirds of the 7,000 civilians killed by paramilitary groups from 1988 to 2005 died in one third of the time, from 1997 to 2002 during the life span of the AUC. At the same time Colombia witnessed a rapid geographical expansion of militia presence. Year 2000 was the peak of paramilitary activity with attacks in 120 municipalities, four times the average geographical incidence of the pre-AUC period -1988 to 1997. This is consistent with the idea that civilians are killed as means of consolidating control over new strongholds. In the words of the AUC leader Carlos Castaño:
" I made of this con ‡ict a high intensity war that now involves the people it must involve: the hidden allies of the guerrilla" (quoted in Aranguren, 2001, p. 116) .
Indeed, the AUC publicly claimed that at least two thirds of the guerrilla members were civilian supporters rather than proper combatants (Aranguren, 14 2001 ). The organization also argued that while the human rights constraints prevent the Colombian military from involving civilians in the con ‡ict, the survival success of the rebels is determined by the capacity of coercing rural communities into supporting them. According to the AUC rhetoric, an e¤ective counterinsurgency strategy must give priority to block these "guerrillas without uniform".
Taking advantage of a presidential transition, in 2002 the AUC leadership estimated the organization had enough leverage to cut a good deal on an eventual peace process (see Romero, 2003) . In December the AUC command unilaterally declared a cease …re as a gesture to foster negotiations with the administration of President Alvaro Uribe. Negotiations started in January 2003 and lasted about three years, ending with a controversial peace process and a massive demobilization of militia combatants in 2006 and 2007. 13 
Data
The con ‡ict dataset used in this paper was …rst introduced by Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2004) . Since 2005 it is mantained by CERAC, a Colombia-based think-tank. It is an event-based con ‡ict dataset on Colombia covering the period 1988-2005. For every event the dataset records its type, the date, location, perpetrator, and victims involved in the incident. The dataset is described thoroughly by Restrepo et al. (2004) and Dube and Vargas (2008) . Here I provide a succinct account of the data collection process.
The dataset is constructed on the basis of events listed in the annexes of periodicals published by two Colombian human rights NGO's: CINEP and Justicia y Paz. Most of the event information in these annexes comes from two primary sources, a network of priests from the Catholic Church-with representation in almost every municipality in Colombia-and over 25 newspapers with national and local coverage. The inclusion of reports from the Catholic priests, who are often located in rural areas that are unlikely to receive press coverage, broadens the municipality-level representation. Based on these sources, the resulting data includes every municipality that has ever experienced a con ‡ict related action (either a unilateral attack or a clash between two groups). There is a stringent regime to guarantee the quality and representativeness of the data. As a …rst step a large number of events and is randomly sampled and compared against the original source, to check for correct coding from the annexes into the dataset. Second, a di¤erent random sample is looked up in press archives to con…rm whether incidents should have been included in the annexes. This step checks the quality of the raw information provided by the NGO's, which turns out to be quite high. Third, the largest events associated with the highest number of casualties are carefully investigated in press records. Finally, without double-coding, the dataset is complemented with additional events provided in reports by human rights NGOs and by Colombian Government agencies.
I use several variables from the CERAC dataset throughout the empirical analysis that follows. These include the number of civilians killed by the paramilitaries (the dependent variable); the number of combatants killed; the number of massacres of civilians 14 ; and the number of attacks by the rebels, which I treat as the baseline proxy of rebel power, R (see Table 1 ). Other proxies of rebel power are a dummy for the presence of rebel fronts (from the Colombia Ministry of Defense); a dummy for the presence of coca crops in 1994 (from the Colombia National Police Department); and a dummy for whether a municipality is a strategic stronghold of FARC, the country's largest rebel group (from Giraldo et al., 2001 )-see Table 1 .
I control for a number of observable time-invariant and time-varying municipalityspeci…c characteristics including (the log of) population-which is used as scale control-, poverty, health and education rates (all from DANE, the national statistics o¢ ce of Colombia); an index of institutional quality (from Fundacion Social, a local NGO); and several geographic characteristics like altitude and average levels of temperature and rainfall (from IGAC, the country's geography bureau)- Table 1 . <Table 1 about here>
Empirical analysis 3.3.1 Benchmark results
Recall from the discussion of the theoretical framework that an empowerment episode triggers two opposite forces: an indirect e¤ect and a direct e¤ect. If the militia gets more powerful, everything else equal, the higher the power of the rebels the weaker the indirect e¤ect, which operates by preventing rebel supporters to switch sides. Hence militia targeting of civilians will be higher in places where rebels are stronger. Table 2 shows evidence in this respect. I regress the number of civilians killed by the militia on the interaction between R (proxied by the number of rebel attacks in a given municipality-year) and a dummy that takes the value of 1 from 1997 to 2002, representing the period where militias colluded into the AUC 15 . The model predicts that the lethality of the rebels should be positively associated with civilian killings by the militia, especially after the formation of the AUC (which shifted the relative balance of power in favor of the militia). In other words, an increase in the power of the militia worsens human security especially in places where the rebels are more powerful. I then expect the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the proxy of R and a dummy for the militia collusion period to be positive and signi…cant.
16 <Table 2 about here> Column 1 of Table 2 reports estimates from pooling the data across municipalities, and years and running an OLS of the number of civilians killed by the militia on the interaction of the number of rebel attacks and the sixyear period of militia empowerment (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) across the pooled data. This speci…cation controls for the non-interacted version of the two variables. Column 2 explores how robust the baseline result is to controlling for a battery of municipality-speci…c observable characteristics, both time-invariant and timevarying. In particular, socioeconomic controls like the poverty rate, school enrollment and an indicator of average health conditions are included. Other controls are municipality-speci…c institutional quality, a dummy for whether the municipality is urban or rural, geographical characteristics like average temperature, altitude and rainfall, and (the log of) the municipality's registered population as a time-varying scale control. Column 3 adds state-speci…c timetrends. This is a very stringent test because there are about 1000 municipalities but just 32 states. The trend controls for serial correlation over time and across municipalities in the same state.
A potential problem with the approach taken in columns 1 to 3 is that it does not account for potential unobserved municipality-speci…c heterogeneity. If present, such heterogeneity can take di¤erent forms: It may be independent from the covariates or it may be correlated with them. If the unobserved characteristics are independent from the regressors a random-e¤ ects estimation is consistent. However, if the unobserved heterogeneity is systematically correlated with the covariates, failing to remove the time-invariant unmeasured municipality-level characteristics may confound the analysis since it leads to omitted variable bias. Results from a Hausman test (not reported) suggest one cannot accept the null hypothesis that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the covariates. That is, it seems that the data generating process is best described by a …xed-e¤ ects model. Moreover, in addition to municipalityspeci…c …xed-e¤ects, in column 4 I include year …xed-e¤ects, which control for any arbitrary annual changes in the militia killing of civilians. 17 1 6 For conciseness, in the reported tables I only include the coe¢ cients of interest. Estimated coe¢ cients on control variables have the expected sign and vary in signi…cance. These are available from the author by request.
1 7 This speci…cation absorves the time-invariant municipality-speci…c controls. In this sense, while …xed e¤ects estimates are consistent even if the 'true' data generating process has random e¤ects, one disadvantage of …xed over random e¤ects is that the marginal e¤ect of time-invariant regressors cannot be estimated. But this is not true for time-varying controls, which can also be estimated using …xed e¤ects. In any case, in the present analysis I do not conduct substantive interpretation of the impact of any of the controls and focus on the interaction which is relevant according to the theoretical model. All speci…cations account for the fact that stochastic disturbances are likely to be correlated over time within a given municipality, or may have covariances that di¤er across regions. Such potential problems of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity respectively are taken care of by clustering the errors at the municipal level. Hence reported standard errors in all tables are panel-robust.
Results show that the lethality of rebels (as measured by the number of guerrilla unilateral attacks) is positively associated with the number of civilians killed by the militia during the militia empowerment period. 18 The coe¢ cient of interest is signi…cant at 99 percent of con…dence and its magnitude implies that a municipality going from the mean number of rebel attacks in the pre-AUC period to one additional rebel attack during the empowerment of the militia will have 1.1 additional civilians killed by the latter group. This …gure is remarkably stable across the four speci…cations and the e¤ect is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in all cases.
Accounting for the count nature of the data
Count-data are highly non-normal and hence not well estimated by linear regression. The Poisson model is usually incorporated to account for the data generating process that produces counts. For a count y t taking values 0, 1, 2,. . . the Poisson distribution has a parameter representing the mean number of occurrences. The regression model sets:
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 …t Poisson models with and without …xed effects. As in Table 2 the latter includes year-…xed e¤ects to account for any arbitrary annual changes in the dependent variable in addition to the municipalityspeci…c unobserved heterogeneity. 19 The coe¢ cient on the interaction between the proxy for the power of the rebels and the empowerment period of the militia is once again positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at 99 percent con…-dence in both cases. Despite the di¤erence in the magnitude of the coe¢ cients reported in columns 1 and 2, the substantive economic quantity of interest is very similar: A municipality going from the mean number of rebel attacks in the pre-AUC period to one additional rebel attack during the empowerment of the militia, will have 0.4 additional civilians killed by the latter group. Despite the fact that this …gure is quite smaller than the one predicted by the linear regression approach (Table 2) its magnitude is far from negligible if one 1 8 Note that I do not make any claim of causality since the power of rebels is likely to be endogenous. Despite the fact that the …xed-e¤ects approach of column 4 deals in part with such endogeneity by controlling for unobserved characteristics that may be a¤ecting both civilian casualties and the power of the rebels, I interpret the econometric results as associations. Nevertheless these associations are informative, especially since they are consisting with the predictions of the theoretical framework.
1 9 The …xed-e¤ects Poisson model is estimated by conditional maximum likelihood. Because the likelihood function is contional to the aggregate sum of counts the actual number of observations used to estimate the parameters is smaller than the whole sample. takes into account that the average number of civilians killed by the militia per municipality-year is 0.4, hence one additional rebel attack during the AUC period will double the lethality of the militia.
<Table 3 about here> Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 account for the fact that the simple Poisson approach has two potential problems. First, the Poisson distribution sets the population mean ( ) equal to the variance. However, it is often the case for count variables to be overdispersed, that is to have the variance greater than the mean. Here, the variance of the dependent variable (the municipality-year count of civilians killed by the Colombia paramilitary) is 2.7, almost seven times larger than the mean(0.4).
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The second problem of the Poisson approach is that count data may be highly left-skewed, having "excess zeros": Consider the process that could led to a count being zero. A militia front may be stationed in a municipality but abstain from targeting the civilian population. Another municipality may lack militia presence altogether and hence present zero killings by the militia. In the latter case zero militia killings are a certain outcome and thus the number of zeros may be in ‡ated and killings in municipalities free of militia cannot be explained in the same way as killings in militia regions. Here, 94.8% of the 14,370 observations the dependent variable is zero, so the data is indeed highly left-skewed.
This discussion suggests that the Poisson assumptions are most probably not met and di¤erent models for count-data analysis should be considered. Column 3 of Table 3 …ts a (…xed e¤ects) Negative Binomial distribution which can be regarded as a generalization of the Poisson with one additional ancillary parameter that allows the variance to be greater than the mean. The model estimated in column 3 of Table 3 produces an estimate of such parameter that con…rms the existence of overdispersion an validates the Negative Binomial over the Poisson. The coe¢ cient on the interaction of interest is positive and significant and does not di¤er substantively from the marginal e¤ect implied by the Poisson and reported above.
The standard Negative Binomial model does not distinguish between the two possibly di¤erent processes causing a high number of zero counts. Column 4 of Table 3 …ts a zero-in ‡ated Negative Binomial model. The complication of excess zeros is corrected by combining two otherwise separate models: A Logit model is used to predict the cases in which zero is a certain outcome and a Negative Binomial distribution …ts the counts having non-certain zeros. For the former I use as predictors the whole set of time-varying and time-invariant municipality-speci…c characteristics that otherwise serve as controls across speci…cations. Once again the estimated value of the ancillary parameter of the Negative Binomial suggests that this model is more appropriate than the Poisson. In addition, the Vuong test (not reported) suggests that the zero-in ‡ated model is signi…cantly better than the standard Negative Binomial. Finally, the coe¢ cient of interest turns out to be robust to this general model that accounts for both overdispersion and excess zeros and it is indeed positive and signi…cant, this time at 95 percent con…dence. Its marginal e¤ect is also virtually unchanged and so a municipality going from the mean number of rebel attacks (0.6) in the pre-AUC period to one additional rebel attack during the empowerment of the militia, will have on average double number of civilians killed by the latter group.
Other proxies of rebel power
Proxying the power of an armed group that …ghts for territorial control with the number of attacks it carries out on such territory may be problematic. It could be argued that the opposite is in fact true: while the more contested a territory is, the more bellicose activity there will be from contesting groups, the consolidation of territorial control is associated with a rather peaceful period ex post. Table 4 acknowledges such concern and looks at the robustness of the benchmark …xed-e¤ects model presented in Table 2 (column 4) to the use of di¤erent proxies of R . Columns 1 and 2 use a dummy for whether a given municipality is reported-by the military intelligence-to have respectively a FARC or ELN front operating in a municipality, independently of whether there has been any recent active bellicose activity by it or not. The idea is that, everything else equal, rebels hold relatively more power in places where they are reported to have a permanent basis. The results suggest that, with 99 percent con…dence, districts where there is a FARC (ELN) front had an average of 0.6 (0.7) additional militia-sponsored civilian killing in the period 1997-2002. <Table 4 about here> Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 look at other two proxies for R . The coe¢ cient of interest in column 3 is the interaction between the dummy for the militia empowerment period and a dummy for whether a municipality grew any coca plants in 1994 according to a survey conducted that year by the National Police Department. This is arguably highly correlated with the places where the rebels have been traditionally powerful. Indeed, after the Medellin and Cali drug cartels were dismantled in the early-to-mid 1990s the rebels took over the control of the production-tra¢ cking chain. The militia was not involved in the coca business until well after the formation of the AUC in 1997 (Aranguren, 2001) . The interaction term is positive and signi…cant so the baseline results are also robust to the third alternative measure of rebel power and suggest that, everything else equal, had an additional municipality been controlled by the rebels in the period 1997-2002; in expectation such municipality would have had 0.7 additional civilians killed by the militia. In turn, column 4 focus on the e¤ect of rebel power proxied by an indicator of municipalities that, according to the thorough study of rebel territorial control in Colombia by Giraldo et al. (2001) , are strongholds of the FARC, the largest rebel group in Colombia. These are municipalities that: i) belong to the strategic backward of the rebel group-mainly located in the states of Caqueta and Meta-where the rebel command is thought to be located; ii) secure access to strategic roads and rivers (in Caqueta, Cundinamarca, Huila and Guaviare) and iii) ensure a steady …nance source for the rebel group. Column 4 suggests that these municipalities have had on average 1.3 additional civilians killed by the militia in the period of the empowerment of the latter relative to the previous period.
The baseline results are then robust to using a heterogenous set of proxies for rebel power, in addition to time-varying scale controls, state-speci…c time trends, and year and municipality-speci…c …xed e¤ects, which account respectively for time and municipality unobserved heterogeneity not captured by the controls. Table 5 reports additional robustness checks. Columns 1 and 2 check whether the results are robust to changing the dependent variable. Instead of looking at the number of civilians killed by the militia, these columns report the e¤ect of the interaction between R and the militia empowerment period on the number of civilian massacres carried out by the militia. The e¤ect is positive and signi…cant suggesting that, even after controlling for municipality-speci…c economic, social, political, geographical and demographic characteristics, civilians were massacred more by the militias in places where the rebels were more powerful.
Additional robustness checks
Columns 3 and 4 perform falsi…cation tests. A 'placebo'empowerment period, one that also last six years (as the true AUC life-span, 1997-2002), is used instead to interact the proxy for R . The coe¢ cient associating this interaction with the number of civilians killed by the militia is insigni…cant. Further, the model predicts an association between the power of one of the contesting groups and the number of civilians killed by the other. While combatants die as result of clashes with contesting illegal armed groups or government forces, civilians are target with the speci…c objective of consolidate territorial control. Indeed, a di¤erent dependent variable (namely the number of combatants killed by the militia) is not signi…cantly associated with the interaction of interest, after controlling for municipality-speci…c and year …xed e¤ects, state time trends and time-varying characteristics of the municipality. 
Conclusion
Most civil wars witness the killing of non-combatants by both state and nonstate parties. The objective behind this practice seems to be weakening the enemy by eliminating its civilian support network, and take military advantage over it. I capture this idea in a simple model were civilians stationed in a contested territory are killed by the party they do not comply with. In this context I examine under what circumstances the empowerment of one of the groups will result in more or less civilian casualties.
There are two opposite forces captured by the model. On the one hand, assuming that more power translates into a greater killing capacity there is a direct e¤ect whereby more civilians will die as a result of the greater killing capability. On the other hand this same mechanism dissuades some civilians from supporting the enemy, so it is not clear whether the total number of civilians killed increases or decreases. The model predicts that greater power will result in more civilian killings only if the enemy is itself powerful enough.
Using an event-based dataset that permits exploiting the sub-national variation of the Colombian armed con ‡ict, I …nd empirical support for this prediction. The empowerment of illegal right-wing militias resulted in higher killing of civilians in places where the rebels are more powerful. This result is robust to various econometric speci…cations, set of controls, measures of power and dependent variables.
Future work is needed to enrich the model with a more complex economic environment that allows testing predictions on the pattern of killings in places that vary in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics. 
